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Labor; family care and medical leave
Government Code § 12945.2 (amended).
AB 1460 (Moore); 1993 STAT. Ch. 827
(Effective October 4, 1993)
Prior law prohibited an employer' from refusing to grant a request by
any employee2 with more than one year of continuous service with that
employer, and who was eligible for other benefits, to take up to a total of
four months in a twenty-four month period for an unpaid "family care
leave,"3 in connection with the birth, adoption, or serious illness of the
employee's child, or to care for a parent or a spouse who has a serious
health care condition.4
1. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12945.2(c)(2) (amended by Chapter 827) (defining employer as meaning
any person who employs 50 or more persons to perform services for a wage or salary, or the state, and any
political or civil subdivision of the state and cities); cf id. § 12926(d) (West Supp. 1993) (defining employer,
under all other sections of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, Government Code §§ 12900-12999,
as employing at least five employees); id. § 12940(h)(3)(A) (West Supp. 1993) (defining employer as any person
regularly employing one or more persons, or any person acting as an agent of the employer, directly or
indirectly, the state, or any other political or civil subdivision thereof, or cities).
2. See id. § 12926(c) (West Supp. 1993) (defining employee as not including any individual employed
by that employee's parents, spouse, or child or any individual employed under a special license in a nonprofit
sheltered workshop or rehabilitation facility).
3. See Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 427, sec. 49, at 1346 (amending CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12945.2(b)(3)); cf
D.C. CODE ANN. § 36-1302 (1993); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 844 (West Supp. 1993); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 34:11B (West Supp. 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.78.030 (West 1990) (providing for parental or
family leave for male and female employees); Kelly Co. v. Marquardt, 493 N.W.2d 68, 75 (Wis. 1992) (stating
that under the Family Care and Medical Leave Act provisions, employees retain their status, responsibility and
authority while they are on leave); Butzlaff v. Wisconsin Personnel Comm'n, 480 N.W.2d 559, 561 (Wis. 1992)
(holding that an employee must meet two requirements in order to be entitled to benefits under the Family and
Medical Leave Act: (1) Employee must have been employed by the same employer for more than 52 consecutive
weeks; and (2) employee must have worked for the employer more than 1,000 hours during the previous 52
week period). See generally Mafia O'Brien Hylton, "Parental" Leaves and Poor Women: Paying the Price For
Time Off, 52 U. PIrrT. L. REV. 475,478-85 (1991) (critiquing unpaid parental leave and parental leave legislation
recently passed by Congress).
4. 1992 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 427, see. 49, at 1346 (amending CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12945.2(a)). See
generall'y LINDA HAAS. EQUAL PARENTHOOD AND SOCIAL POLICY; A STUDY OF PARENTAL LEAVE IN SWEDEN
(1992) (analyzing the Swedish governmental program promoting participation of mothers and fathers equally
in childcare and allowing an aggregate of 12 months leave time between the mother and father to care for the
child with return to one's original job being assured); LISE VOGEL, MOTHERS ON THE JOB: MATERNITY POLICY
IN THE U.S. WORKPLACE (1993) (discussing the policies and strategies for dealing with maternity leave in the
workplace); Gabrielle Lessard, Conflicting Demands Meet Conflict Of Laws. ERISA Preemption of Wisconsin
Family' and Medical Leave Act, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 809 (discussing the provisions of the Wisconsin Family
Medical and Leave Act as well as other similar provisions from other state statutes and their interaction with
the Federal Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974); Rick Holguin, Untraditional Families Closer
To Getting Benefits, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1993, at JI (discussing the possibility for "non-traditional" families,
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Chapter 827 authorizes an eligible employee to take "family care and
medical leave" because of a serious health condition5 of the employee that
makes the employee unable to perform the functions of his or her
position.6 Chapter 827 also changes the limit on this leave to twelve
working weeks in a twelve month period.7 Chapter 827 additionally makes
the family and medical leave provisions applicable to the state and any
political or civil subdivision of the state or cities.8 Chapter 827 further
provides that, notwithstanding existing law, it is not an unlawful
employment practice for an employer of fifty or more employees to refuse
to grant an employee's request for family care and medical leave if the
employer employs less than fifty employees within seventy-five miles of
the employee's worksite.9
Under existing law, an employer may require that a request for leave
to care for a child, spouse, or parent who has a serious health condition be
supported by a certification issued from a health care provider.") Chapter
827 allows the employer to request second and third opinions in regard to
the validity of the initial certification with respect to the employees own
serious health condition." Chapter 827 further allows an employer, as a
condition of the employee's return from leave taken because of the
including gay and lesbian couples, to receive benefits that city government officials have reserved for traditional
families).
5. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12945.2(c)(7)(A),(B) (amended by Chapter 827) (defining "serious health
condition" as meaning an illness, injury, impairment, or physical or mental condition that involves either
inpatient care in a hospital, hospice, or residential health care facility or continuing treatment or continuing
supervision by a health care provider).
6. Id. § 12945.2(c)(3)(C) (amended by Chapter 827); see id. § 12945.2(c)(3) (amended by Chapter 827)
(defining family care and medical leave); see also ASSEMBLY COMMITEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, CONMI'rEr
ANALYSIS OF AB 1460, at 1 (June 2, 1993) (stating that Chapter 827 clarifies and conforms state law to the
federal Family and Medical Care Leave Act of 1993). See generally Donna R. Lenhoff & Sylvia M. Becker,
Family and Medical Leave Legislation in the States: Toward A Coniprehensive Approach, 26 HARV. J. ON LEOIS.
403 (1989) (discussing recent trends in family leave legislation); Frank Swoboda, Famnily Issues Make Slow
Progress in Labor Contracts, WASH. POST, Apr. 5, 1992, at H2 (discussing the incorporation of work-family
issues into union contracts); George White, Fulfilling Family Needs; More Finns Adjust To lWorkers' Personal
Lives, L.A. TImES, Nov. 15, 1991, at DI (discussing the steps taken by major United States companies to ease
the burden of working and raising a family at the same time).
7. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12945.2(a) (amended by Chapter 827); see id. § 12945.2(c)(5) (amended by
Chapter 827) (defining health care provider); cf. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-184(b) (1991); FLM. STAT. ch.
440.13(I)(b) (West 1992); GA. CODE. ANN. § 31-7-172(4) (1991); HAW. REV. STAT. § 671-1 (1992); IND. CODE.
ANN. § 27-12-2-1 (West Supp. 1993) (defining health care provider). See generally George L. Blum, Annotation,
Medical Malpractice: Who Are "Health Care Providers," or the Like, Whose Actions Fall lithin Statutes
Specifically Governing Actions and Damages For Medical Malpractice, 12 A.L.R. 5th (1993) (discussing who
or what are health care providers).
8. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12945.2(c)(2)(B) (amended by Chapter 827).
9. 1& § 12945.2(b) (amended by Chapter 827).
10. Id. § 12945.2t3)-(k) (amended by Chapter 827).
11. Id. § 12945.2(k)(2) (amended by Chapter 827).
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employee's own serious health condition, to require the employee to obtain
certification from the employee's health care provider that the employee
is able to resume working.
12
Existing law provides that an employee taking family care leave may
elect, or the employer may require, the employee to substitute vacation
leave or other accrued time off, during the period of leave. 13 However,
existing law prohibits an employee from using accrued sick leave, unless
mutually agreed to by the employer and the employee. 4 Chapter 827
permits an employee to elect, or an employer to require an employee, to
substitute accrued sick leave during the period of leave if the leave is
taken for the employee's own serious health condition.
15
Existing law provides that an employee taking family care leave
continues to be eligible to participate in health care benefit plans during
the period of the leave to the extent and under the same conditions as
apply to any unpaid leave taken for any other purpose. 6 It is permissible,
in the absence of the aforementioned conditions, to require the employee
to pay health and welfare benefit plan premiums at the group rate during
the period of leave. 7 Chapter 827 requires an employer, during any
period that an employee takes family care and medical leave, to maintain
and pay for the employees medical coverage under a group health plan. 8
Chapter 827 further allows an employer to recover the premium that the
employer paid for maintaining coverage for the employee under the group
health plan under specified conditions. 9
Prior law allowed an employer to deny a request for family care leave
if necessary to prevent undue hardship to the employer's operations."
Chapter 827 deletes this provision.2'
12. Id. § 12945.2(k)(4) (amended by Chapter 827).





18. Id. § 12945.2(t) (amended by Chapter 827).
19. Id. § 12945.2(f)(1) (amended by Chapter 827); see id. § 12945.2(f)(1)(A)-(B) (amended by Chapter
827) (stating that an employer may recover the premium that the employer paid for maintaining the coverage
for the employee under the group health plan, if both of the following conditions are present: (1) The employee
fails to return from leave after the period of leave to which the employee is entitled has expired; and, (2) the
employees's failure to return to work is not the result of the continuation recurrence, or onset of a serious health
condition that entitles the employee to leave, or other circumstances beyond the control of the employee).
20. 1992 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 427, sec. 49, at 1346 (amending CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12945.2).
21. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12945.2 (amended by Chapter 827).
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Prior law allowed an employer to refuse to grant a request for family
care leave of a salaried employee who was one of the five highest paid
employees or among the top ten percent of employees in terms of gross
salary.22 Chapter 827, in conformity with the Federal Family and Medical
Leave Act of 1993,23 allows an employer to refuse to reinstate in the
same or comparable position, a salaried person coming back from family
care and medical leave who is among the highest paid ten percent of the
employees employed within seventy-five miles of the employee's
worksite.24 Chapter 827 specifies that the aggregate amount of leave
taken under either this act or the Federal Family and Medical Leave Act
of 1993 must not be in excess of twelve workweeks.25 Chapter 827
authorizes the Fair Employment and Housing Commission to establish
different minimum duration requirements for various types of leave.26
Additionally, the Commission shall permit leave to be taken in specified
increments for recurring medical treatment.
27
Under prior law, an employer could refuse to grant an employee family
care leave to care for a child if the child's other parent was also taking
leave at the same time, or if the total cumulative leave for the two parents
exceeded the four month limit.28 Chapter 827 limits the aforementioned
provision to cases where both parents are employed by the same employer
and the leave is in relation to birth, adoption, or foster care of a child.29
JVE
22. 1992 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 427, sec. 49, at 1346 (amending CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12945.2(q)).
23. See 5 U.S.C.S. §§ 6831-6836 (1993) (establishing the federal rules and regulations for family care
and medical leave). See generally Dana Canedy, New Fanily Leare Act Reassuring To Some, Headache For
Others, PLAIN DEALER, Feb. 7, 1993, at 1E (discussing arguments in support of and opposition to the federal
Family and Medical Care Leave Act of 1993); Wayne Hicks, Family Leave: Why Is Business Rattled, DENVER
BUs. J., March 26, 1993, at 35 (discussing the enactment of the federal Family and Medical Leave legislation
and its effects on businesses).
24. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12945.2(r)(1)(A) (amended by Chapter 827).
25. Id. § 12945.2(s) (amended by Chapter 827).
26. 1993 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 827. sec. 2, at 40 (amending CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12945.2).
27. Id.
28. 1992 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 427, sec. 49, at 1346 (amending CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12945.2(o)).
29. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12945.2(p) (amended by Chapter 827).
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Labor; harassment on the basis of sex
Government Code § 12940 (amended).
AB 675 (Moore); 1993 STAT. Ch. 711
Existing law forbids employers1  from harassing employees 2  or
applicants for employment on the basis of their sex.3 Chapter 711
explicitly defines harassment on the basis of sex to include sexual
1. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12940(h)(3)(A) (amended by Chapter 711) (defining employer in harassment
claims as any individual who employs at least one other person). But see id. § 12926(d) (,Vest Supp. 1993)
(defining employer as any individual who employs at least five others for purposes of all remaining subdivisions
of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA)). See generally id. §§ 12900-12995 (West 1992
& Supp. 1993) (setting forth the provisions of FEHA).
2. See id. § 12926(c) (West Supp. 1993) (excluding from the definition of employee individuals
employed by their parents, spouses, or children, or anyone employed in a non-profit sheltered workshop or
rehabilitation facility under a special license).
3. Id. § 12940(h) (amended by Chapter 711); see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988) (classifying as
unlawful any employment discrimination on the basis of sex); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1992) (explaining that
sexual harassment qualifies as sex discrimination as defined in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964);
Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64-67 (1986) (designating sexual harassment, particularly
that resulting from a hostile work environment, as a type of discrimination actionable under Title VII, and ruling
that tangible loss is not a requirement for such a claim); Janet Selden, Employer Liability for "Hostile
Enviroinent" Sexual Harassment, Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 31 How. L.J. 51, 52-65 (1990)
(tracing the history of employment liability in hostile environment claims and relating it to Meritor Savings
Bank); Christopher P. Barton, Note, Between the Boss and a Hard Place: A Consideration of Meritor Savings
Bank, FSB and the Law of Sexual Harassment, 67 B.U. L. REV. 445, 457-73 (1987) (discussing the Meritor
Savings Bank case and offering resolutions to issues left untreated by the Court); Marlisa Vinciguerra, Note, The
Aftermath of Meritor: A Search for Standards in the Law of Sexual Harassment, 98 YALE L.J. 1717, 1720 (1989)
(exploring the "often subtle interplay" between hostile work environment and quid pro quo harassment); see also
Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 621 (6th Cir. 1986) (requiring reasonable interference with
plaintiff's work performance and serious psychological impact on the well-being of the alleged victim before
allowing recovery). But see Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 876-77 (9th Cir. 1991) (departing from the Rabidue
rationale in holding that an employee should not endure harassment to a degree which results in serious
psychological effect); id. (finding a prima facie case of sexual harassment to exist where a plaintiff has faced
a hostile environment or has suffered detrimental interference with work performance). Compare Amy Horton,
Comment, Of Supervision, Centerfolds, and Censorship: Sexual Harassment, the First Amendment, and the
Contours of Title VII, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 403, 453 (1991) (suggesting that expressions violative of Title VII,
if protected by the First Amendment, may subordinate the rights of employees to work in a harassment-free
environment) with Kingsley R. Browne, Title VII as Censorship: Hostile Enviromnent Harassment and the First
Amendment, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 481, 550 (1991) (denouncing censorship as the means to obliterate sexist speech).
Browne advocates the use of "persuasive response" to offensive views as the superior solution. Id.; cf. CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 46a-60(8) (Supp. 1993) (prohibiting employers from harassing any employee or applicant on the
basis of sex). See generally TITUS A. AARON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE (1993) (discussing
Meritor Savings Bank in the context of Supreme Court decisions and recent events in Congress).
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harassment,4 gender harassment,5 and harassment based on pregnancy,6
childbirth,7 or related medical conditions.8
AK
Labor; occupational safety and health
Labor Code §§ 6314, 6651, 7314, 7350 (amended).
AB 2016 (Conroy); 1993 STAT. Ch. 998
4. See Department of Fair Employment & Hous. v. Ambylou Enter., Inc., No. 82-06, FEHC Precedential
Decisions 1982-83, 6 (1982) (defining sexual harassment as any verbal, physical, or sexual behavior
demonstrated toward a person because of gender); CAL. CODE RrGS. tit. 2, § 7287.6(b) (1990) (interpreting
sexual harassment to include verbal, physical, and visual harassment, or unwanted sexual advances); CATHARINE
A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 1 (1979) (describing sexual harassment as an
undesired sexual requirement in a relationship of unequal power); see also Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d
1406, 1414 (10th Cir. 1987) (delineating two types of sexual harassment: quid pro quo and hostile work
environment); Susan M. Faccenda, Note, The Emerging Law of Sexual Harassment: Relief Available to the
Public Employee, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 677, 677 (1987) (suggesting that types of sexual haraSsmLnt range
from single instances to "continuous sexual tormenting"). See generally Aaron, supra note 3 (tracing the rise
of sexual harassment as a social issue); ALBA CONTE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE: LAW AND
PRACTICE (1990) (presenting a history of sexual harassment law, outlining the elements of sexual harassment
claims, and surveying applicable law on both the federal and state levels); BARBARA LINDERMANN & DAVID
KADUE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN EMPLOYMiENT LAW (1992) (defining forms of harassment and exploring the
corresponding theories of liability); WILLIAM PETROCELLI & BARBARA KATE REPA, SEXUAL HARASSMENT ON
THE JOB (1992) (addressing the background, causes, and effects of sexual harassment, along with the view taken
towards it by the legal profession).
5. See Joshua F. Thorpe, Note, Gender-Based Harassment and the Hostile Work Environment, 1990
DUKE L.J. 1361, 1362 (1990) (defining gender harassment as unequal treatment based solely on a person's
maleness or femaleness). Thorpe distinguishes between sexual harassment and gender harassment by observing
that undue criticism, epithets, rude remarks, and insults may not be backed by sexual motivation, "but may
nonetheless flow from a gender-based animus." Id. at 1363; see also Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., Inc., 842 F.2d
1010, 1014 (8th Cir. 1988) (finding that intimidation towards women solely "because they are women" is not
necessarily limited to explicit sexual advances or similar conduct). See generally Joan C, Williams,
Deconstncting Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797, 800 (1989) (differentiating between men and women not only
because of biological "sex," but also because of social "gender").
6. See STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1251 (25th ed. 1990) (defining pregnancy).
7. See id. at 288 (25th ed. 1990) (defining childbirth).
8. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12940(h)(3)(C) (amended by Chapter 711); see ASSEMBLY FLOOR ANALYSIS
OF AB 675, at 1-2 (Sept. 1, 1993) (noting that the intent of Chapter 711 is to counter any real or feigned
ignorance by employers that discrimination on the basis of sex is limited to sexual harassment); see also
Department of Fair Employment & Hous. v. Fresno Hilton Hotel, No. 84-03, FEHC Precedential Decisions 1984-
85, 28 n.7 (1984) (explaining that harassment may include almost any type of conduct, extending not only to
physical behavior, but also to blocking of movement, interference, verbal statements, epithet,,, derogatory
remarks, visual displays, offensive writings, pictures, or photographs); ef. 42 U.S.C, § 2000c(k) (1988)
(extending the phrase "on the basis of sex" to include pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions).
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Under existing law, the Division of Occupational Safety and Health
(Division)' is authorized to investigate any accident or illness that occurs
within an industrial or occupational workplace.2 Additionally, existing law
permits the chief of the Division, or any other authorized Division
inspectors, to investigate a place of employment3 during regular working
hours, or any reasonable times, in order to protect the safety and health of
employees.4
Prior law provided that if the chief or the chief's authorized
representative was refused entry by the employer, the chief or the
representative could issue an order to preserve any materials or accident
sites in order to determine the cause of the accident or illness.' Chapter
998 allows the chief to issue an order to preserve any materials or accident
sites regardless of whether entry was refused, if such action is necessary
to determine the cause of the accident or illness, and if the evidence may
be removed, damaged, or altered.6
1. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 56 (West 1989) (creating the Division of Occupational Safety and Health
within the Department of Industrial Relations).
2. Id. § 6313(a)-(b) (West 1989); see id. §6300 (West 1989) (enacting the California Occupational Safety
and Health Act of 1973 and setting forth its purpose); cf 29 U.S.C. § 657(a) (1988) (authorizing the
investigation and inspection of places of employment under the Federal Occupational Safety and Health Act).
See generally CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, § 342(a) (1990) (requiring employers to report any occupational accident,
illness, or death to the Division); id. § 344.50 (requiring the Division to investigate and inspect places of
employment and to impose civil penalties if necessary); id. § 344.51 (stating that the function of the Bureau of
Investigations, within the Division, is to conduct criminal investigation of occupational accidents).
3. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 6303(a) (West 1989) (defining place of employment as any place where
employment is carried on); id. §6303(b) (West 1989) (defining employment as any operation in which any
person is working for hire, except for household domestic service).
4. Id. § 6314(a) (West 1989); see also id. § 6300 (West 1989) (requiring employers to provide for safe
and healthful working conditions); cf 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1993) (setting forth the purpose and policy behind the
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970); ALASKA STAT. § 18.60.010 (1991) (discussing the legislative
intent behind requiring employers to provide for safe places of employment); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 106(a)
(1985) (authorizing the Department of Labor to make rules for the prevention of accidents in places of
employment); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-8-1.1-2 (West 1991); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 338.031 (1)(a) (Baldwin
1988) (creating a duty for employers to establish and maintain safe and healthful places of employment); MIss.
CODE ANN. § 71-1-1 (1989) (empowering the State Board of Health to establish an occupational health and
safety program).
5. 1984 Cal. Stat. ch. 1317, sec. 4, at 4521 (amending CAL. LAB. CODE § 6314).
6. CAL. LAB. CODE § 6314(e) (amended by Chapter 998). See generaly Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436
U.S. 307, 311 (1978) (stating that certain areas in commercial facilities are entitled to Fourth Amendment
protection); Parrish v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 66 Cal. 2d 260, 267, 425 P.2d 223, 228, 57 Cal. Rptr. 623, 628
(1967) (concluding that criminal probable cause standards should have been used to test the legality of searches
by social workers into homes of guardians of children on welfare); Salwasser Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Municipal Court,
94 Cal. App. 3d 223, 231, 156 Cal. Rptr. 292, 297 (1979) (stating that the legality of inspections conducted by
the Division of Occupational Safety and Health are to be measured by criminal probable cause standards); ;
Anthony T. Caso, Nonconsensital Cal/OSHA Inspections After Salwasser: They're Still Illegal, 14 PAC. L.J. 913
(1983) (analyzing the impact of Salwasser on administrative search regulations in California); David Douglas
Doyle, Comment, Criminal Probable Cause in Administrative Searches Under Califonia OSHA: Mandated or
Preempted?, II PAC. L.J. 1019 (1980) (discussing the relation between administrative searches and criminal
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Under prior law an action to collect any civil penalty relating to safety
in employment had to commence no later than three years from the date
of notification of the penalty.7 Chapter 998 changes the time of
commencement, so that an action to collect a penalty or fee must
commence no later than three years from the date of a final assessment of
the penalty.8
APL
Labor; occupational safety and health-asbestos
Labor Code §§ 9021.7, 9021.9 (new); §§ 6501.8, 9021.6
(amended).
SB 877 (Marks); 1993 STAT. Ch. 1075
probable cause under California law); Judy E. Zelin, Annotation, ProprietY of State or Local Government Health
Oficer's Warrantless Search-Post Camara Cases, 53 A.L.R. 4th 1168 (1987 & Supp. 1993) (discussing the
inspection and investigation of places of employment by health officials under the Federal Occupational Safety
and Health Act or similar state provisions).
7. 1991 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 1210, sec. 3, at 5102 (enacting CAL. LAB. CODE § 6651).
8. CAL. LAB. CODE § 665 1(a) (amended by Chapter 998); see id. § 6651 (b) (amended by Chapter 998)
(noting that subdivision (a) only applies to penalty assessments or fees for which the three year period has not
expired prior to the effective date of Chapter 998).
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Under existing law, contractors' who engage in asbestos-related work2
of any significance 3 must pass an asbestos certification exam administered
by the Contractors' State License Board (CSLB).4 Existing law exempts
from this asbestos certification exam requirement those contractors whose
asbestos-related work involves the installation, maintenance, and repair of
1. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7026 (West Supp. 1993) (defining contractor broadly to include most
"builder" type activities involving roads, grounds, or structures); id. § 7026.1 (West Supp. 1993) (expanding the
definition of contractor to include fixed heating and air conditioning unit servicers, home improvers, tree
removers, and well drillers); id. § 7026.2(a) (West Supp. 1993) (expanding the definition of contractor to include
builders, repairers, and movers of mobilehomes or mobilehome accessory buildings); Hydrotech Systems v. Oasis
Waterpark, 52 Cal. 3d 988, 995, 803 P.2d 370, 374, 277 Cal. Rptr. 517, 521 (1991) (stating that foreign
contractors, and persons involved in isolated transactions or unique building services may be deemed contractors
for licensing purposes); Lewis & Queen v. N.M. Ball Sons, 48 Cal. 2d 141, 147, 308 P.2d 713, 717 (1957)
(determining that a furnisher of equipment for a highway construction project was a contractor for licensing
purposes); Leonard v. Hermreck, 168 Cal. App. 2d 142, 144-45, 335 P.2d 515, 516-17 (1959) (holding that a
party who hauled and dumped dirt on a roadbed during construction was a contractor for licensing purposes);
Howard v. State, 85 Cal. App. 2d 361, 364, 193 P.2d 11, 13 (1948) (holding that repair, alteration, and
improvement of a building may involve painting, and that painters are contractors for licensing purposes). But
see Contractors Dump Truck Serv. v. Gregg Constr. Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 1, 7, 46 Cal. Rptr. 738, 742-43
(1965) (holding that a furnisher of labor and equipment was a contractor for lien purposes, but noting the same
person might not be a contractor for licensing purposes if that person's activity was limited to renting tractors
and other earthmoving equipment, and hiring out the drivers, and the person had no supervisory responsibility
for the job); Rodoni v. Harbor Eng'rs, 191 Cal. App. 2d 560, 562-63, 12 Cal. Rptr. 924, 926 (1961) (holding
that a person whose activity was limited to renting tractors and earthmoving equipment, as well as hiring out
the drivers, was an employee of a general contractor and not a subcontractor).
2. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 6501.8(a) (West 1989) (defining asbestos-related work as any activity which
by disturbing asbestos-containing construction materials may release asbestos fibers into the air, but excluding
activities involving mining, excavation, or manufacture of asbestos ore or materials, or installation or repair of
automotive materials containing asbestos); id. § 6501.8(b) (West 1989) (defining asbestos-containing construction
materials as those with more than one tenth of one percent asbestos by weight); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §
7058.5(a) (West Supp. 1993) (adopting the definition of asbestos-related work provided in California Labor Code
§ 6501.8). See generally Environmental Encapsulating Corp. v. City of New York, 855 F.2d 48, 50 (2nd Cir.
1988) (noting that more than half the commercial high-rises built in New York City between 1958 and 1972
incorporate asbestos-containing materials, an estimated 3.5 million tons citywide); Mullen v. Armstrong World
Industries, Inc., 200 Cal. App. 3d 250, 258, 246 Cal. Rptr. 32, 37 (1988) (stating that asbestos is used in
flooring, gaskets, packing, paints, coatings, sealants, plastics, cement pipes and sheets, electrical conduit,
insulation, pads, mats, filters, decorative building panels, plaster, stucco, asphalt, caulk, fire doors, siding,
shingles, wallboards, acoustical ceiling materials, and switches).
3. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 6501.5 (West 1989) (establishing a statutory application threshold of at least
100 square feet of surface area of asbestos-containing material); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7058.5(a) (West
Supp. 1993) (adopting the 100 square feet of surface area threshold); cf. MICH. COmP. LAws ANN. § 338.3207(2)
(West 1992) (establishing a statutory application threshold, valid through June 1, 1993, of at least 160 square
feet or 260 linear feet of friable asbestos materials).
4. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7058.5(a) (Vest 1993); see id. (establishing the asbestos examination
and certification requirement); cf. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20435 (Vest Supp. 1993) (requiring that asbestos
contractors be licensed); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 338.3207 (\Vest 1992) (requiring that asbestos abatement
contractors be licensed); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 643.232.1(1)-(2) (Vernon Supp. 1993) (requiring that asbestos
abatement contractors register annually); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 49.26.115 (West 1993) (requiring that
contractors obtain an asbestos contractor's certificate).
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asbestos cement pipe or sheets, vinyl asbestos floor materials, or asbestos
bituminous or resinous materials.5
Under existing law, asbestos is recognized as unhealthful6 and
contractors who engage in asbestos-related work must register with the
Division of Occupational Safety and Health (DOSH).7 Chapter 1075
5. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 7058.5(a) (West Supp. 1993); cf. HAW. REV. STAT. § 444-7.5(a) (Supp.
1992) (exempting otherwise licensed contractors from further licensing as specialty contractors for activities such
as maintenance, repair, or removal of asbestos pipe or sheets, vinyl asbestos floor materials or asbestos-
bituminous or resinous materials, as well as for other activities deemed incidental to the primary purposc for
which the contractors holds a license, where such activities are performed safely).
6. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 6501.5(0 (West 1989) (requiring that the California Division of Occupational
Safety and Health regulate asbestos-related work to protect the health and safety of employees); CAL. CODL
REGs. tit. 8, § 1529 (1992) (regulating asbestos-related construction activities to protect worker health and
safety); id. § 5208 (1992) (regulating asbestos-related industrial activities to protect worker health and safety);
Henning v. Division of Occupational Safety and Health, 219 Cal. App. 3d 747, 762, 268 Cal. Rptr. 476, 485
(1988) (noting that regulation of contractors engaging in asbestos-related work of the kind governed by statute
is designed to foster the safety and health of employees and others who may be adversely affected); see also
29 C.F.R. §§ 1910.1001, 1926.58 (1992) (establishing federal rules and standards for asbestos-related indu!.trial
and construction activities to protect worker health and safety); Associated Indus. of Mass. v. Snow, 898 F.2d
274, 276 (Ist Cir. 1990) (noting that asbestos is dangerous, that it poses a significant public health threat, and
that its tiny indestructible fibers can crumble into powder and become airborne, travelling in open air or through
a building's ventilation system); id. at 280 (noting that each sweep of a broom by a worker not trained to
recognize asbestos and dispose of it properly, poses a threat to the health of the public); Environmental
Encapsulating Corp. v. City of New York, 855 F.2d 48, 50 (2d Cir. 1988) (identifying asbestos a& a formidable
public health threat and the cause of asbestosis, lung cancer, gastrointestinal cancer, and mesothelioma). See
generally Ira Pilchen, Asbestos, 'The Magical Mineral,' Creates Toxic Tort 'Avalanche,' 75 JUDICATURE 320
(Apr/May 1992) (reporting that as early as the first century, slaves working with asbestos used transparent
bladder skins to prevent inhalation of the deadly dust).
7. CAL. LAB. CODE § 6501.5(a) (West 1989); see id. § 6501.5 (West 1989) (requiring for registration
that an applicant contractor attest under penalty of perjury that he or she is certified pursuant to California
Business and Professions Code § 7058.5, has health insurance or trust accounts for each employee engaged in
asbestos-related work, has trained all employees, and is both proficient and properly equipped); CAL. CODE
REGs. tit. 8, § 341.6 (1992) (providing general registration requirements and definitions); id. § 341.7(4)
(providing specific registration requirements, including a declaration under penalty of perjury that the employer
knows applicable safety and health standards and will comply); see also 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(3) (1988)
(authorizing the Secretary of Labor to set mandatory occupational safety and heath standards for businesses
affecting interstate commerce); id. § 667(b) (1988) (encouraging states to assume responsibility for development
and enforcement of occupational safety and health standards by submitting a plan which assures the Secretary
of Labor that state standards will meet or exceed federal guidelines); 29 C.F.R. §§ 1910.1001, 1926.58 (1992)
(establishing federal rules and standards for asbestos-related industrial and construction activities to protect
worker health and safety); CAL. LAB. CODE § 50.7(a) (West 1989) (designating the Department of Industrial
Relations as the state agency responsible for administering the plan for development and enforcement of
occupational safety and health standards which correspond to federal standards promulgated under 29 U.S.C.
§ 651-678 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, §§ 1529, 5208 (1992) (providing corresponding
state rules and standards in the form of safety orders for asbestos-related construction and industrial work); North
Valley Baptist Church v. McMahon, 696 F. Supp. 518, 528 (E.D. Cal. 1988) (noting that registration is an
imprecise term which defines a variety of divergent types of regulation; that the common distinguishing element
is the relative laxity of state oversight; that registration generally requires the regulated entity to file a statement
which shows compliance with all governing standards or criteria; that thereafter the entity bears a continuing
responsibility to comply; and that usually the state will have no further involvement until and unless a complaint
is lodged).
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exempts from this DOSH registration requirement those contractors whose
asbestos-related work involves the installation, maintenance, repair, or
nondestructive removal of asbestos cement pipe used outside of buildings,
if the work is accomplished safely,8 and if supervisors and employees
have received task-specific training.9
Under Chapter 1075, the Occupational Safety and Health Standards
Board must specify requirements for task-specific training programs, and
approve qualified training providers.' 0 Chapter 1075 also authorizes
DOSH to charge qualified asbestos training providers a fee to cover
administrative costs of the approval process."
MKF
8. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 6501.8(c) (enacted by Chapter 1075) (adopting asbestos exposur iction levels
determined in accordance with California Code of Regulations title 8, §§ 1529 and 5208); CAL. CODE REGS.
tit. 8, § 1529 (1992) (providing instructions in the form of a safety order for asbestos-related construction work);
id. § 5208 (providing instructions in the form of a safety order for asbestos-related industrial work); cf.
Independent Sch. Dist. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 752 F. Supp. 286, 305 (D. Minn. 1990) (holding that a school
district has a cause of action in tort for asbestos-related damages, and noting that there is no indication that
compliance with both federal safety regulations and state tort standards is impossible); J'aire Corp. v. Gregory,
24 Cal. 3d 799, 805, 598 P.2d 60, 64, 157 Cal. Rptr. 407, 411 (1979) (stating the well-settled law that a
contractor has a duty to avoid injury to the person or property of third parties); Chance v. Lawry's Inc., 58 Cal.
2d 368, 378, 374 P.2d 185, 190, 24 Cal. Rptr. 209, 214 (1962) (holding that an independent contractor who by
his own negligence creates dangerous conditions during the progress of the work, is liable for harm caused
thereby, and that a contractor's duty of care is a general duty to use reasonable care to prevent damage to
persons who may reasonably be expected to be affected); Holt v. Department of Food and Agric., 171 Cal. App.
3d 427, 435-36, 218 Cal. Rptr. 1, 6 (1985) (holding that when human life is at stake the rule of due care and
diligence as it applies to employees requires that, without regard to difficulties or expense, every reasonable
precaution must be taken to assure the safety of persons in the area); id. (stating that the standard of care when
dealing with dangerous articles is so great that a slight deviation therefrom will constitute negligence).
9. CAL. LAB. CODE § 6501.8(c) (enacted by Chapter 1075); see Henning, 219 Cal. App. 3d at 763, 268
Cal. Rptr. at 485 (1988) (eliminating a DOSH emergency regulation that exempted from DOSH registration
contractors whose asbestos-related work involved installation, maintenance and repair of asbestos cement pipe,
and who were thereby already exempt from the CSLB asbestos certification exam); id. at 760, 268 Cal. Rptr.
at 483 (recognizing that DOSH attempted to harmonize the asbestos certification exam requirements of California
Business and Professions Code § 7058.5 with the asbestos registration requirements of California Labor Code
§ 6501.5, by importing an exception from the former into the latter); id. at 762, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 485 (holding
that CSLB certification is not the equivalent of DOSH registration, and that exemption from one does not imply
an exclusion from the other); id. (holding that the regulation granting the exemption was contrary to the clear
statutory intent of protecting the health and safety of workers); id. (stating that in view of the different functions
of DOSH and CSLB, harmony between DOSH asbestos registration and CSLB asbestos certification
requirements was not necessary); see also ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, COMMITrEE
ANALYSIS OF AB 3202, at 2 (Apr. 8, 1992) (stating that AB 3202, a 1992 bill virtually identical to SB 877,
sought to overturn the decision in Henning); id. (noting that the decision in Henning vacated DOSH emergency
regulations which made contractors who were already exempt from the CSLB asbestos certification exam also
exempt from DOSH registration requirements).
10. CAL. LAB. CODE § 6501.8(c) (enacted by Chapter 1075); see id. (mandating the development of task-
specific training requirements, to include certain topics and information defined by statute, as well as approval
of providers).
11. Id. §§ 9021.7, 9021.9(c) (enacted by Chapter 1075).
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Labor; overtime-compensating time off
Labor Code § 204.3 (new).
AB 2092 (Takasugi); 1993 STAT. Ch. 544
Under the existing federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) of 1938,1
no employer 2 may employ3 any employee,4 except as specified,' for a
workweek6  longer than forty hours, unless the employee receives
compensation for the excess hours at a rate not less than one and one-half
times the employee's regular rate7 of compensation.' In addition, only
I. See 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1988) (establishing 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219, as the Fair Labor Standards. Act
(FLSA) of 1938).
2. See id. § 203(d) (1988) (defining employer).
3. See id. § 203(g) (1988) (defining employ); see also Secretary of Labor, U.S. Dept, of Labor v. E. R.
Field, Inc., 495 F.2d 749, 751 (1st Cir. 1974) (stating that, under the FLSA, an employee's activity is
"employment" if it is done at least in part for the benefit of the employer, even though it may also be beneficial
to the employee).
4. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1)-(4) (1988) (defining employee).
5. See id. § 213(a)(l)-(15) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990) (exempting certain employees and industries, such
as executives and professionals, outside salesmen, clothing laundries or cleaners, amusement parks, agriculture,
newspaper publishing, babysitting, seamen on non-American vessels, motion picture theaters, and the canning
or marketing of fish or shellfish, among others, from the regulations concerning the maximum hours that may
be worked in a week); Brennan v. Six Flags Over Georgia, 474 F.2d 18, 19 (5th Cir. 1973) (holding that it is
the character of the work, not the source of payment, that controls in determining the applicability of exemptions
provided for in the FLSA); id. (stating that the exemption is not a subsidy for the employer); Roney v. United
States, 790 F. Supp. 23, 27 (D.D.C. 1992) (stating that the test of whether an employee is within the
administrative exemption under the FLSA, so as not to be entitled to overtime compensation, is whether the
employee's activities are directly related to management policies or general business operations); see also
Donovan v. Carls Drug Co., Inc., 703 F.2d 650, 652 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that pharmacists paid an hourly
rate and not a salary were not professional employees exempt from FLSA provisions); Donovan v. Burger King
Corp., 672 F.2d 221, 227 (1st Cir. 1982) (holding that assistant managers of fast food restaurants, who earned
at least $250 per week, had management responsibilities as their primary duty under the FLSA and, thus, were
exempt from the overtime requirements of the FLSA).
6. See 29 C.F.R. § 778.102 (1992) (clarifying that the FLSA does not limit the hours an employee may
work in a workweek, but only requires that the employee be paid overtime compensation for those hours in
excess of 40, and stating that the FLSA does not require an employee be paid overtime compensation for hours
in excess of eight per day, or for work on Saturdays, Sundays, holidays, or regular days of rest); id. § 778.105
(1992) (specifying that an employee's workweek is a fixed and regularly recurring period of 168 hours,
consisting of seven 24-hour periods, and need not coincide with the calendar week, but may begin on any day
and at any time); see also Sanford v. Weinberger, 752 F.2d 636, 638-39 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (stating that the
calendar week, rather than each period of seven consecutive days of work scheduled, could properly be
considered the administrative workweek for purposes of calculating overtime pay, and stating that it is a matter
of the agency's discretion to determine which seven consecutive calendar days constitute the administrative
workweek).
7. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(e) (1988) (defining the regular rate at which an employee is employed to include
remuneration for employment paid to, or on behalf of, the employee).
8. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (1988); see Boehm v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 868 F.2d 1182, 1183-85
(10th Cir. 1989) (holding that "power company linemen were not entitled to overtime compensation for time
they spent 'on call,"' since "the linemen were free to leave the employer's premises, and did so, and were free
to use their off-duty time as they wished, provided that they could be contacted and were willing to report to
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employees of a public agency which is a state, political subdivision of a
state, or interstate governmental agency,9 may receive compensating time
off'0 at a rate not less than one and one-half hours for each hour of
employment for which overtime compensation is required, in lieu of
overtime compensation." Chapter 544 provides that, subject to specified
conditions, 2 any employee may receive compensating time off13 in lieu
work one-third of the time that they were called"); Mullins v. Howard County, Md., 730 F. Supp. 667, 671
(D.Md. 1990) (stating that overtime pay earned by an employee during a properly selected work period "must
be paid in the next paycheck after overtime is worked, unless its computation cannot be practicably
accomplished by then"); Renfro v. City of Emporia, 729 F. Supp. 747, 751 (D. Kan. 1990) (holding that
"municipal fire fighters' on-call time was compensable under the FLSA"); id. (stating that, although the fire
fighters were not required to remain on station house premises, conditions of on-call status were so
circumscribed that they restricted the employee from effectively using the time for personal pursuits, and finding
that the primary beneficiary of the on-call scheme was the city).
9. See 29 C.F.R. § 553.20 (1992) (indicating that a public agency which is a state, political subdivision
of a state, or interstate governmental agency is defined broadly to include state and local agencies).
10. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(o)(6)(B) (1988) (defining "compensating time off' as hours during which an
employee is not working, which are not counted as hours worked during the applicable workweek or other work
period for the purpose of overtime compensation, and for which the employee is compensated at the employee's
regular rate).
11. Id. § 207(o)(1) (1988); see id. § 207(o)(6)(A) (1988) (defining overtime compensation as that
compensation required by 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)); Moreau v. Klevenhagen, 113 S. Ct. 1905, 1912 (1993) (holding
that, since Texas law prohibited a county from entering a collective bargaining agreement with the deputy
sheriffs' union, the county was not required to enter into an agreement with the union before it could pay
deputies compensatory time in lieu of cash for overtime work pursuant to the FLSA); Abbott v. City of Virginia
Beach, 689 F. Supp. 600, 604 (E.D. Va. 1988) (stating that the provision of the FLSA governing overtime
compensation, requiring a public agency to provide compensatory time pursuant to the applicable provisions of
a collective bargaining agreement or any other agreement between the public agency and representatives of such
employees, applies only where state law permits employees of state and local governmental entities to have
recognized representatives); cf. ALA. CODE § 36-21-4 (1991); ARiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-391 to 392 (Supp.
1993); CAL. EDUc. CODE §§ 45128, 88027 (West 1989 & 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-460c (Supp. 1993);
IDAHO CODE § 67-5329 (1989); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33:2213.1 (West 1988); NEV. REV. STAT. § 281.100
(1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 124.18 (Anderson 1990); OKLA. STAT. tit. 74, § 840.16d (Supp. 1993); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 8-11-55 (Law Co-op Supp. 1992); WASH. REV. CODE § 72.01.042 (1982) (authorizing state and
local governmental agencies to compensate their public employees with compensatory time off in lieu of
overtime compensation). But see State of Nevada Employees' Ass'n v. Bryan, 916 F.2d 1384, 1390 (9th Cir.
1990) (holding that the state employees' association was the lawfully recognized representative of the state
employees, even though state law prohibited recognition of any collective bargaining unit to represent state
employees, since the legislature had recognized the association as the representative of the employees in another
context, the state was now required to reach an agreement with the state employees' association before enacting
a compensatory time-off policy in lieu of overtime compensation).
12. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 204.3(b)(1)-(4) (enacted by Chapter 544) (specifying that an employer may
provide compensating time off if: (1) The compensating time off is provided under a written agreement between
the employer and the employee, or the employee's duly authorized representative; (2) the employee has not
received compensating time off in excess of 240 hours; (3) the employee has made a written request for
compensating time off in lieu of overtime compensation; and (4) the employee is regularly scheduled to work
no less than 40 hours per workweek).
13. See id. § 204.3(g) (enacted by Chapter 544) (defining "compensating time off' the same as federal
law); supra note 10.
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of overtime compensation.'4 Chapter 544 specifies that an employee may
receive up to 240 hours of compensating time off, and requires the
payment of overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of that
maximum.' 5 Chapter 544 does not apply to any employee who is exempt
from the overtime provisions of the California wage orders or who falls
under specified wage orders affecting certain industries.'
6
FSG
14. Id. § 204.3(a) (enacted by Chapter 544); see id. (specifying that the compensating time off rate will
be no less than one and one-half hours for each hour of employment for which overtime compensation is
required by law).
15. Id. § 204.3(c)(1) (enacted by Chapter 544).
16. CAL. LAB. CODE § 204.3(h)-(i) (enacted by Chapter 544); see 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (1988)
(specifying that the only overtime compensation allowed for employees covered by the FLSA is compensation
at one and one-half times their regular rate of pay, thus not providing for compensatory time off in lieu of
overtime compensation); CAL. LAB. CODE § 204.3(i) (enacted by Chapter 544) (providing that compensatory
time off shall not apply to any employee who is subject to wage orders of the Industrial Welfare Commission
(IWC) affecting the following industries: (1) The manufacturing industry; (2) the canning, freezing, and
preserving industry; (3) public housekeeping; (4) industries handling products after harvest; (5) the amusement
and recreation industry; (6) industries preparing agricultural products for market; and (7) agriculture); id, § 1173
(West 1989) (authorizing the IWC to amend, rescind, or adopt a portion or an entire wage order covering any
occupation, trade, or industry); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, §§ 11010-11150 (1993) (specifying the regulations
established by the IWC wage orders that provide minimum standards in wages, hours, and working conditions
for 15 industry or occupational groups for California workers in the private sector); id. §§ 11010(1), 11020(1),
11030(1), 11040(1), 11050(1), 11060(1), 11070(1), 11080(1), 11090(1), 11100(1), 11110(1), 11120(1), 11130(1),
11140(1), 11150(1) (1993) (exempting administrative, executive, and professional employees, among others, from
regulation under the IWC orders governing wages, hours, and working conditions for California workers in the
private sector); see also SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, COMMITEE ANALYSIS OF AB 2092, at 2-3 (August 19,
1993) (stating that AB 2092 applies only to a very narrow group of workers because of the large number of
industries and workers exempted under the bill and the fact that the federal FLSA, which applies to all
employers with workers who are actually engaged in interstate commerce or who have gross annual sales of
$500,000 or more, does not recognize compensatory time off for private sector workers). See generally Julia
Lawlor, Rat Race RedarAWorkers Want to Get a Life, USA TODAY, Sept. 3, 1993, at IB (noting that Ihe average
workweek for manufacturing employees is now the highest it has been since 1966, at 41.4 hours, since
employers are working people longer hours to avoid hiring more staff and paying the high cost of health and
pension benefits); Wesley E. Overson, It's Time to Restructure Overtime, THE RECORDER, Jan. 27, 1993, at 6
(noting that the FLSA does not allow compensating time off in place of paying overtime pay, even though
allowing it "would provide the unemployed more job opportunities, grant employees needed flexibility, and
provide employees with needed time for their families or time to seek out further training"); Diane Patrick,
Professional Status or Payment for Overtime: How Should Legal Assistants Be Compensated?, TIE RECORDER,
Oct. 26, 1992, at 7 (discussing that a recent survey suggests that almost half of all employers of legal assistants
either misunderstand or ignore the FLSA regulations as they pertain to legal assistants and assume they do not
have to pay overtime to salaried employees or that compensating time is equivalent to, or an acceptable
substitute for, the payment of overtime wages); Carla Rivera, Fight Over Pay Cuts Escalating, L.A. TiMES, Aug.
10, 1993, at BI (discussing that as an alternative to a pay cut, the union for the government employees of Los
Angeles County has proposed giving up overtime pay this year, at a savings of $90 million, and would either
convert the overtime into compensatory time off or not receive the overtime payment until July 1, 1994).
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